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[1243] 
“The Experience and Good Thinking Foreign 
Sources May Convey”: Justice Ginsburg and 
the Use of Foreign Law 
Jeremy Waldron* 
This Article is an appreciation of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg's defense of the 
Supreme Court's use of foreign law, particularly her arguments about what our courts 
can learn from the work that foreign courts have done. The Article extends and 
develops Justice Ginsburg's account, drawing an analogy between courts learning from 
one another, and scientists learning from one another in a community of inquiry. 
 
 * University Professor, New York University Law School. Some material in this Article is 
drawn from chapter four of my book, “Partly Laws Common to All Mankind”: Foreign Law in 
American Courts (forthcoming Yale University Press 2012). 
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I. 
In the debate about the citation of foreign law that exploded in 2005 
in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Roper v. Simmons,1 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has been a distinguished proponent of the 
view that there can be no objection to a court’s referring to the decisions 
of other courts in the course of its own reasoning and that much is to be 
gained in the way of insight and learning from close attention to the way 
in which foreign courts solve problems that are similar or analogous to 
the problems that we face. “Foreign opinions,” she says, “are not 
authoritative; they set no binding precedent for the U.S. judge. But they 
can add to the store of knowledge relevant to the solution of trying 
questions.”2  
True, she acknowledges that the United States has been a leader, 
not a follower, in the establishment of modern constitutionalism, but she 
quotes with approval Judge Guido Calabresi’s observation that “[w]ise 
parents do not hesitate to learn from their children.”3 In Justice 
Ginsburg’s view, the learning should go on in both directions. It is, she 
says, a matter of “comparative dialogue,” not just learning from others, 
but sharing with them.4 The solutions that we have found for certain legal 
problems that are analogous to the problems that they face are evidently 
helpful to them. 
Let me offer a mundane example to illustrate that point. Some years 
ago, a court in New Zealand followed American lines of reasoning in the 
course of disposing of a case about flag burning.5 The case was 
Hopkinson v Police, concerning a young man who set fire to a flag on the 
grounds of the New Zealand Parliament, protesting a visit by the 
Australian Prime Minister over some concern about Australian 
participation in the second Iraq war.6 He was arrested, charged, and 
convicted under the Flags, Emblems, and Names Protection Act 1981, a 
 
 1. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). But the debate had been simmering in a line of cases concerning the use 
of foreign law in decisions about the death penalty. See generally Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990 (2002) 
(denying certiorari); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990 (1999) 
(denying certiorari, but debating the role of foreign law in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence); 
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988); Enmund v. 
Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).  
 2. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, “A Decent Respect to the Opinions of [Human]kind”: The Value of a 
Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, 26 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 187, 190 (2007). 
 3. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, “A Decent Respect to the Opinions of [Human]kind”: The Value of a 
Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, 99 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 351, 352 (2005). 
This is a slightly different version of the article cited supra note 2. The quote came from Judge 
Calabresi’s opinion in United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464, 469 (2d Cir. 1995).  
 4. Ginsburg, supra note 2, at 188. 
 5. Hopkinson v Police [2004] 3 NZLR 704 (HC), ¶¶ 50, 66 (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 
(1989); United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990)). 
 6. Id. ¶ 4.  
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statute that makes it an offense to destroy the New Zealand flag with the 
intention of dishonoring it.7 Mr. Hopkinson appealed his conviction on 
the ground that burning a flag in protest was not a way of dishonoring 
the national symbol, at least not under any interpretation of “dishonor” 
that would avoid conflict with the free speech provisions of the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (“NZBORA”).8 
The New Zealand court followed the order of inquiry laid down in 
American cases like Texas v. Johnson,9 deciding first whether protection 
of the flag was a legitimate legislative goal, and only then turning to the 
inquiry about whether an across-the-board prohibition on flag burning 
was an appropriately tailored measure to use in pursuit of that goal.10 The 
New Zealand judge also cited a New Jersey precedent as persuasive 
authority for the proposition that “dishonoring” the flag may have, for 
the purposes of the NZBORA, a limited meaning that does not 
necessarily comprehend ceremonial burning as a political act.11 
Hopkinson is a case of minor importance, and I very much doubt 
that it has come to Justice Ginsburg’s attention. But it illustrates in a 
usefully mundane way the proposition that countries venturing in 
relatively recent times into rights-based review can and do pay attention 
to the work of legal systems that have been doing it for centuries. I call 
the case “usefully mundane” precisely because it is not a momentous 
decision taken at the apex of a court system but just business as usual in a 
relatively low-level appeal.12 This was nothing fancy, just a case before an 
ordinary working judge. But it did involve the citation of foreign law. 
Reading it helps us to see that what seems like a big deal in the 
 
 7. Id. ¶¶ 1, 13. Section 11 of the Flags, Emblems, and Names Protection Act 1981 states: 
“Offences involving New Zealand Flag: (1) Every person commits an offence against this Act 
who . . . (b) in or within view of any public place, uses, displays, destroys, or damages the New Zealand 
Flag in any manner with the intention of dishonouring it.”  
 8. Hopkinson, 3 NZLR ¶¶ 22–24. New Zealand has a form of very weak judicial review, which 
requires courts to choose, among available interpretations of offending statutes, those that are most 
congenial to the letter and the spirit of the NZBORA. Under Section 14 of NZBORA, “[e]veryone 
has the right to freedom of expression.” Section 6 of the NZBORA directs an interpretation consistent 
with the Bill of Rights to be preferred “[w]herever an enactment can be given a meaning that is 
consistent with the rights and freedoms” in the Bill of Rights. New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, 
pt. 1, § 6. 
 9. 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
 10. Hopkinson, 3 NZLR ¶¶ 43–77. 
 11. Id. ¶ 79 (citing State v. Schlueter, 23 A.2d 249, 251 (N.J. 1941)). 
 12. Justice France, who decided Hopkinson, is now on the New Zealand Court of Appeal, but the 
High Court in which she sat in this case is just one step up from the district court where Mr. 
Hopkinson was initially convicted. (There are two appellate levels above the High Court in New 
Zealand: the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court.) The Role of the Courts, Courts of New 
Zealand, http://www.courtsofnz.govt.nz/about/system/role/overview (last visited May 1, 2012); The 
Judges of the Court of Appeal, Courts of New Zealand, http://www.courtsofnz.govt.nz/about/ 
appeal/judges (last visited May 1, 2012). 
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American context is often done quite easily and without fuss in other 
courts, high and low, around the world. 
Perhaps we should say, then, that if courts in other countries are 
willing to do this and show themselves capable of doing it, we in the 
United States, in our turn, should not be shy about occasionally seeking 
enlightenment for our own problem solving from the laws and decisions 
of other nations.13 As Justice Ginsburg puts it,  
[i]f U.S. experience and decisions can be instructive to systems that 
have more recently instituted or invigorated judicial review for 
constitutionality, so we can learn from others including Canada, South 
Africa, and most recently the U.K.—now engaged in measuring 
ordinary laws and executive actions against charters securing basic 
rights.14  
After all, as she points out, “[j]udges in the United States are free to 
consult all manner of commentary—Restatements, Treatises, what law 
professors or even law students write copiously in law reviews.”15 If these 
can be cited, then why not the similarly erudite analysis “contained in an 
opinion of the Supreme Court of Canada, the Constitutional Court of 
South Africa, the German Constitutional Court, or the European Court 
of Human Rights?”16 
Other Supreme Court Justices have joined Justice Ginsburg in her 
defense of this practice. Justice Breyer has spoken of “the enormous 
value in any discipline of trying to learn from the similar experience of 
others.”17 The practice of citing foreign law, he says, “involves opening 
your eyes to what is going on elsewhere, taking what you learn for what 
it is worth, and using it as a point of comparison where doing so will 
prove helpful.”18 Former Justice O’Connor believes that “there is much 
to learn from other distinguished jurists who have given thought to the 
same difficult issues that we face here.”19 She says,  
Other legal systems continue to innovate, to experiment, and to find 
new solutions to the new legal problems that arise each day; they offer 
much from which we can learn and benefit. . . . Our flexibility—our 
ability to borrow ideas from other legal systems—is what will enable us 
to remain progressive, with systems that can cope with a rapidly 
shrinking world.20 
 
 13. See Ginsburg, supra note 2, at 187. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 193. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Stephen Breyer, Keynote Address, 97 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 265, 266 (2003). 
 18. Norman Dorsen, The Relevance of Foreign Legal Materials in U.S. Constitutional Cases: A 
Conversation Between Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen Breyer, 3 Int’l J. Const. L. 519, 524 
(2005). 
 19. Sandra Day O’Connor, Keynote Address, 96 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 348, 350 (2002). 
 20. Sandra Day O’Connor, The Majesty of the Law: Reflections of a Supreme Court Justice 
234–35 (2003). 
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II. 
In a comment published in 2005,21 shortly after the decision in Roper 
v. Simmons, I expressed some concern that we do not yet have anything 
like a good jurisprudential theory of the citation of foreign law, 
comparable (say) to the theories that we have for the citation of 
precedents:22  
The theory that is called for is not necessarily a complete 
jurisprudence. But it has to be complicated enough to answer a host of 
questions raised by the practice: about the authority accorded foreign 
law (persuasive versus conclusive), about the areas in which foreign 
law should and should not be cited (private law, for example, 
compared to constitutional law), and about which foreign legal systems 
should be cited (only democracies, for example, or tyrannies as well).23  
It has to be convincing enough to dispel the serious misgivings that many 
Americans have about this practice in relation to their national 
sovereignty and their values of democracy and self-determination.24 
Above all, it has to be a theory of law, a theory that treats the citation of 
foreign decisions not just as a rather good idea, but as something that can 
be integrated into a coherent jurisprudence.25 
The practice need not be defended as immune to abuse. In his 
dissent in Roper, Justice Scalia said that the Court’s citation of foreign 
law was unprincipled and opportunistic.26 But it does not follow that 
there cannot be a good theory to support such a practice. Using my 
analogy again, Justice Scalia has sometimes claimed that the Court’s 
following and departing from precedent is unprincipled and 
opportunistic.27 But this does not mean he rejects stare decisis or that he 
thinks it is not worth developing a theory of precedent. Similarly, we 
should not reject the idea of a theory of the citation of foreign law simply 
because we see judges cite foreign law opportunistically; we should reject 
it only if we think unprincipled citation is inevitable under the auspices of 
such a theory.28 
Justice Ginsburg’s comments point us in the direction of one line of 
theoretical justification.29 The justification Justice Ginsburg advances 
 
 21. Jeremy Waldron, Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 129, 129–31 
(2005). The two following paragraphs are drawn from these pages. 
 22. See, e.g., Neil Duxbury, The Nature and Authority of Precedent (2008); Michael J. 
Gerhardt, The Power of Precedent (2008). 
 23. Waldron, supra note 21, at 129–30. 
 24. Id.  
 25. Id.  
 26. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 627 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Waldron, supra note 21, at 
130. 
 27. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 538, 586–87 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also 
Waldron, supra note 21, at 130–31. 
 28. Waldron, supra note 21, at 131. 
 29. There are other lines worth exploring, too, such as the idea that in areas of fundamental rights 
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rests on the idea that our courts can learn from what other courts in 
other countries are doing when they address questions that are the same 
or substantially similar to questions we are addressing. 
Before I address these issues in depth, I should mention in addition 
that Justice Ginsburg has also made a start in the rebuttal of some of the 
more common objections to this practice. Against those who worry about 
differences in the circumstances—legal, social, and political—in which 
foreign decisions are made, she says, “Yes, we should approach foreign 
legal materials with sensitivity to our differences,” but she insists that 
such sensitivity by itself “should not lead us to abandon the effort to 
learn what we can from the experience and good thinking foreign sources 
may convey.”30 This is surely right: Lawyers relate principles and 
precedents to differences of circumstance all the time; it is one of the 
things we are supposed to be good at.31 We do it for case-by-case 
reasoning, we do it when we rely on old American precedents for 
modern constitutional decisions, and constitutional originalists have to 
do it all the time to bring the sayings of the Founding Fathers into some 
intelligent relation with circumstances today that are massively different 
from those of 1787. Justice Ginsburg also addresses the deficiencies and 
imperfections that may characterize the citation of foreign law at the 
moment. We must be sensitive to these, she says, and make an effort to 
correct the imperfections, but again that is no reason to discontinue the 
practice as opposed to trying to improve it.32 
Finally, she addresses the objection from democracy, insisting first 
that it must be answered in the context of the already accepted practice 
of strong judicial review: We must begin by taking notice of “the fact that 
the judiciary is an undemocratic institution—at least the federal judiciary 
 
it is good to have a degree of consistency or integrity throughout the world as well as within particular 
legal systems. I have elaborated that rather difficult argument elsewhere, and I will not pursue it in the 
present Article. See Jeremy Waldron, Treating Like Cases Alike in the World: The Theoretical Basis of 
the Demand for Legal Unity, in Highest Courts and Globalisation 99 (Sam Muller & Sidney 
Richards eds., 2010); Jeremy Waldron, “Partly Laws Common to All Mankind”: Foreign Law in 
American Courts, ch. 5 (forthcoming Yale University Press 2012) [hereinafter Waldron, All 
Mankind]. This second line of argument is particularly important for thinking about cases where the 
Court seems to be simply invoking statistics about foreign law—for instance, what proportion of 
countries have the juvenile death penalty—rather than gleaning insights from particular opinions. For 
this point, see Ernest A. Young, Foreign Law and the Denominator Problem, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 148, 
151–53 (2005), and Ganesh Sitaraman, The Use and Abuse of Foreign Law in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 32 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 653, 681 (2009). However, there has been some suggestion in 
the literature that we can learn even from the sheer numbers, in the spirit of Condorcet’s jury 
theorem. See Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Other States, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 131, 140–
43 (2006) (drawing upon Marquis de Condorcet, Essay on the Application of Mathematics to the 
Theory of Decision-Making, in Condorcet: Selected Writings 33, 48–49 (Keith Michael Baker ed., 
1976)). 
 30. Ginsburg, supra note 2, at 190. 
 31. I argue this at length in Waldron, All Mankind, supra note 29, ch. 7. 
 32. Ginsburg, supra note 2, at 190. 
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is—we’re appointed, not elected, and we’re there for life.”33 She 
emphasizes that foreign law is never cited as binding, and she asks 
whether, once that point is accepted, “looking at a decision by Aharon 
Barak, Chief Justice of the Israeli Supreme Court, is any less democratic 
than reading a law review piece by a U.S. law professor.”34 
It is worth distinguishing whatever controversies we have about the 
democratic character of judicial review from our controversies about the 
materials that are appropriately cited to interpret constitutional 
provisions and bills of rights. Even if we had only weak judicial review, of 
(say) the British model, we would still have to argue about the place of 
precedent, legal scholarship, and foreign sources in our understanding of 
the relevant provisions.35 
However, I want to focus on the main line of argument: the 
epistemic argument based on gaining knowledge from looking abroad.36 
Justice Ginsburg has pointed us in a fruitful direction. But is it possible to 
flesh out the account of what sort of learning is involved and how exactly, 
for the purposes of a legal theory or a theory of judicial reasoning, this 
learning is supposed to take place? I guess someone might ask whether 
we actually need a whole theory. Justice Ginsburg’s account is offered in 
terms of “comparative side glances”37 rather than anything grand like a 
juridical epistemology. But in fact her observations indicate a number of 
ways in which the learning-from-others argument might be elaborated. 
Thus, for example, she refers to foreign law as “a pool of potential 
and useful information,”38 and we surely want our judicial opinions here 
to be well-informed. She implies that foreign law can furnish us with 
possible solutions to the legal problems that we face, when our own 
menu of solutions looks a little meager: 
Other courts are now grappling with problems similar to problems we 
confront. Right now, most urgently, the balance between liberty and 
security occupies our attention. Would it not be instructive to look at 
how the Supreme Court of Israel, for example, has dealt with terrorist 
cases similar to those now coming before our courts?39 
She suggests also that reference to foreign law may function 
sometimes as a means to test “understanding of one’s own traditions and 
 
 33. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, An Open Discussion with Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 36 Conn. L. 
Rev. 1033, 1041 (2004). 
 34. Id. 
 35. I have pursued this line of argument in Jeremy Waldron, Rights and the Citation of Foreign 
Law, in The Legal Protection of Human Rights: Sceptical Essays 410 (Tom Campbell et al. eds., 
2011) and in Waldron, All Mankind, supra note 29, ch. 6. 
 36. Ginsburg, supra note 33, at 1040. 
 37. Ginsburg, supra note 2, at 192. 
 38. Id. at 190 (quoting Patricia M. Wald, The Use of International Law in the American 
Adjudicative Process, 27 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 431, 439 (2004)). 
 39. Ginsburg, supra note 33, at 1041. 
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possibilities by examining them in the [reflected light cast by other legal 
systems].”40 Such tests may sometimes be negatively as well as 
affirmatively suggestive.41 And at one point she cites the words of Patricia 
Wald, saying that reference “to decisions rendered abroad,” may provide 
us with indications of “common denominators of basic fairness governing 
relationships between the governors and the governed.”42 These are all 
highly suggestive remarks. But they are compactly expressed, and I hope 
I will not be read as overinterpreting them if I try to expand upon these 
observations in the context of this argument about learning from others. 
III. 
Let us begin with Justice Ginsburg’s idea of “a pool of potential and 
useful information.”43 Information about what? All sorts of things go into 
a judicial opinion: concepts, insights, empirical evidence, doctrinal tests, 
lines of argumentation, rules, principles, the weighing of principles, the 
citation and weighing of precedents, interpretive strategies, moral values, 
and so on. What category of knowledge is supposed to be in this pool of 
potential and useful information, made accessible to us by recourse to 
foreign law? 
Is it that we can gain empirical insight? Consider Roper v. Simmons, 
the juvenile death penalty case.44 The decision was based in large part on 
certain propositions in social psychology, to the effect that young people 
have an underdeveloped sense of responsibility, often resulting in 
impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions; they are more 
vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, 
including peer pressure; and the character of a juvenile is not as well 
formed as that of an adult.45 “These differences,” as the Court said, 
“render suspect any conclusion that a juvenile falls among the worst 
offenders” (which of course is the conclusion constitutionally required 
for the application of the death penalty).46 But as Ernest Young points 
out, the Supreme Court of the United States did not need to learn all 
that from its foreign counterparts; our Justices already knew it, because it 
was set out at the beginning of Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court, 
long before he got to the issue of foreign law.47 
 
 40. Ginsburg, supra note 2, at 191–92 (quoting Vicki C. Jackson, Comment, Constitutional 
Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance, Engagement, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 109, 114 (2005)). 
 41. See Ginsburg, supra note 3, at 354. 
 42. Id. (citing Patricia M. Wald, The Use of International Law in the American Adjudicative 
Process, 27 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 431, 439 (2004)). 
 43. Ginsburg, supra note 2, at 190. 
 44. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 45. Id. at 569–70. 
 46. Id. at 570. 
 47. See Young, supra note 29, at 148–49. 
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Sometimes, however, the empirical material that is needed for 
responsible decisionmaking is not available locally. In Washington v. 
Glucksberg, Chief Justice Rehnquist drew heavily on Dutch experience 
with a scheme of legalized euthanasia to establish a good sense of the 
regulatory challenges that would surround the practice and to argue 
against simply blundering into this area with judicial fiat.48 And Justice 
Ginsburg has suggested that we can become acquainted with some truths 
of political science, relevant to our Constitution, from the experience of 
other countries with similar structures (and sometimes from their 
experience with dissimilar structures).49 As an example, she mentions 
Vicki Jackson’s discussion of Justice Robert Jackson’s concurring 
opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,50 citing, as it did, the 
experience of other Western countries with emergency powers 
arrangements of various kinds.51 
In her discussion of Vicki Jackson’s work, Justice Ginsburg 
mentions also the negative value that information derived from foreign 
sources may have.52 Foreign experience with some constitutional 
arrangement might help to refute or cast doubt upon commonly accepted 
claims in the United States about what the consequences of such 
arrangements might be. It is sometimes hard to break out of locally 
established mindsets, and reference to foreign law, if undertaken 
carefully, can help us do this. As Laurie Ackerman, formerly of the 
South African Constitutional Court, once explained, 
one can easily become trapped into a sort of tunnel vision, from which 
it is difficult to escape, or to see other or lateral answers. . . . It is in this 
context that foreign law can play a particularly valuable role. It may be 
that, when one commences the enquiry into foreign law one is 
psychologically hoping to find confirmation for one’s hypotheses, but if 
one remains alive to falsifying possibilities, the foreign law can be of 
particular value.53 
This is particularly important to help us move beyond the narrow 
language of “confirmation” in Justice Kennedy’s account of the use of 
 
 48. 521 U.S. 702, 710 n.8, 730, 732, 734–35 (1997). 
 49. Ginsburg, supra note 3, at 354–55. 
 50. 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952).  
 51. Justice Ginsburg discusses congressional testimony given by Vicki Jackson on this matter. See 
Ginsburg, supra note 3, at 354–55; Ginsburg, supra note 2, at 192–93; see also Vicki C. Jackson, 
Constitutional Law and Transnational Comparisons: The Youngstown Decision and American 
Exceptionalism, 30 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 191, 199–200 (2006). 
 52. Ginsburg, supra note 3, at 354; Ginsburg, supra note 2, at 192. 
 53. Laurie W.H. Ackermann, Constitutional Comparativism in South Africa: A Response to Sir 
Basil Markesinis and Jörg Fedtke, 80 Tul. L. Rev. 169, 185 (2005). There are similar suggestions, too, 
in Sir Basil Markesinis & Jörg Fedtke, Judicial Recourse to Foreign Law: A New Source of 
Inspiration? 127, 135 (2006), in subheadings such as “When foreign experience . . . help[s] disprove 
locally expressed fears about the consequences of a particular legal solution” and “When the foreign 
law provides ‘additional’ evidence that a proposed solution has ‘worked’ in other systems.” 
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foreign law in Roper.54 It is an old Popperian insight that looking for 
possible refutations is epistemically much more respectable in empirical 
inquiry, and more productive, too, than just looking smugly for possible 
confirmations.55 
IV. 
Besides empirical information and analysis, what else can be learned 
from the reasoning in a foreign decision? Are we supposed to be able to 
glean some new moral insight from a foreign precedent? For example, 
did the Court in Roper learn something about the abhorrent nature of 
the juvenile death penalty from its survey of its abolition the world over? 
Probably not. The pros and cons were pretty well-known in the United 
States already, although it is salutary to be reminded of the ferocity with 
which the death penalty is condemned in other jurisdictions. It is also 
worth ascertaining the moral view that other legal systems take of some 
options which seem obvious to us. For example, in the juvenile death 
penalty debate, I find that many Americans believe that life 
imprisonment without parole is a humane alternative punishment. Few 
are aware that other countries adamantly oppose life without parole as 
an alternative punishment for murder, certainly as an alternative 
punishment for juveniles. They see that, too, as a violation of human 
rights.56 So there is some learning to be done here, if not about moral 
truth itself, then about the nature and prevalence of certain moral 
attitudes that are quite strikingly different from our own and about the 
significance of the disparity. The argument is not that we should simply 
“fall into line” with a global consensus on this matter. But awareness of 
difference is nevertheless the beginning of wisdom, if only because it 
provides an occasion for a deeper consideration of what were previously 
firm, but largely thoughtless, convictions.57 This must be in large part 
what Justice Ginsburg means when she talks about enhancing one’s 
“understanding of one’s own traditions and possibilities by examining 
them in the [reflected light cast by other legal systems].”58 
 
 54. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (“The opinion of the world community, while not 
controlling our outcome, does provide respected and significant confirmation for our own conclusions.”). 
 55. Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge 36 
(1962). 
 56. See Dirk van Zyl Smit, Taking Life Imprisonment Seriously in National and 
International Law (2002). 
 57. Justice Breyer’s writing about European doctrines of “the death row syndrome” in his 
dissents (from denials of certiorari) in Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 996 (1999), and Foster v. 
Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 992 (2002), may also fall into this category. 
 58. Ginsburg, supra note 2, at 191–92 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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V. 
In my view, the most interesting understanding of the epistemology 
involved in our courts’ use of foreign law is not empirical information, 
not general public policy, and not even moral philosophy (pure or 
applied). It is rather a specifically legal epistemology: We stand to gain in 
terms of our ability to conduct and engage in legal analysis. I mentioned 
above Justice Ginsburg’s observation that American judges are free to 
consult and to cite in their opinions “all manner of commentary—
Restatements, Treatises, what law professors or even law students write 
copiously in law reviews.”59 When they refer to these sources, judges do 
so not for information or moral insight necessarily, but for suggested 
pathways of analysis through difficult legal problems. 
Lawyers and judges have a particular way of approaching problems. 
If you put an issue before a lawyer—such as the juvenile death penalty—
she will (if she has time) carefully take the issue apart, separating the 
application of various principles from one another, and laying out in 
some logical order a series of hard, interlocking, and quite abstract 
questions about the nature of culpability, the use of bright lines (such as 
an age of majority), the different functions of adult and juvenile courts, 
the in terrorem effects of being tried as an adult, the purposes of 
punishment, the rights of victims and their families, the impact of 
punishment on a young person (particularly in the way it relates 
individual action to outcomes over the course of a whole life), the 
connection between the mental element in culpability and the capacity to 
foresee the long-term impact of punishment, the purpose of having an 
array of penalties from the least to the most severe, and the nature and 
safeguards of whatever accompanying discretion might be vested in a 
court. A lawyer will lay all of that out and try to figure a way through the 
maze of these articulated issues. That is also what we legal scholars do in 
(the best of) our law review articles and that, too, is what is done in 
doctrinal treatises and restatements (not just in criminal law and 
constitutional law, but in areas of private law also). 
Something like this sort of analysis is typical of lawyerly thinking 
and mentality the world over. We recognize someone as a lawyer as 
much by her use of this method as by her citation of codes, statutes, and 
precedents, though normally we would expect to see both. No doubt, in 
my example, lawyers from different jurisdictions would work through the 
issues I have mentioned in a different order, with a different structure. 
Some elements might be omitted, some others included, depending on 
the particular features of their legal system. They will be guided by the 
formal elements of their code or by the doctrines that emerge from the 
 
 59. Id. at 193. 
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precedents they study. But, one way or another, this is what lawyers’ 
reasoning is like. 
A lawyer, when she confronts a problem, tries to anatomize it, 
uncover its underlying structure and the order in which the issues 
entangled in the problem are best addressed. In this she is encouraged by 
the lawmakers to whose activity she is necessarily responding. For 
example, a lawyer’s mode of analysis matches what statute drafters do 
when they are writing legislation to address a difficult problem. 
Legislators don’t just simply say, “Do this” or “Don’t do that.” They 
identify an array of considerations under which conduct, described in a 
certain way or having certain characteristics (mental, physical, and 
circumstantial), is to be regarded as prohibited or obligatory. Having laid 
down a rule in that complex form, legislators might also identify certain 
exceptions, which might also be complex in character. Then the statute 
will stipulate consequences that are attached to the prohibited activity 
(with these characteristics, in these conditions, and absent these 
exceptions), consequences that will have a procedural as well as a 
substantive aspect. In these ways, a provision of positive law provides a 
template for analyzing a messy situation. The idea is that each element of 
statutory complexity corresponds to some important piece of the 
behavioral or situational jigsaw, so that analyzing a real-world problem 
in the way the statutory template indicates is not just a way of falling into 
line with the law; it is also a way of guaranteeing that the things 
identified and ordered in the analysis are important elements and dealt 
with in the structure in an appropriate order of priority. As I say, this is 
apparent in complex statutory provisions, but it is apparent also in 
common law doctrine and in the tests and elaborations that courts, 
responding to their own estimations of what is important, add to the 
statutory language to make it capable of dealing adequately with 
situations that, whether the drafters foresaw it or not, have to be dealt 
with under the auspices of the statutory analysis. 
In some circles all this is controversial. Some jurists suggest we 
should abandon any pretense of any distinctive and autonomous analytic 
method for our profession.60 They think we should retool ourselves and 
move to something more like direct public policy advocacy or economic 
or social analysis.61 For anyone in this category, what I am saying will be 
unconvincing. For them, the learning that takes place when American 
judges consult foreign sources can be only empirical or public policy 
learning. It cannot be anything distinctively legal. Certainly, one would 
not want to push the line I am taking too far. Though I have in mind 
specifically legal learning, I am not predicating my argument here on any 
 
 60. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Overcoming Law 387–405 (1995). 
 61. Id. 
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wholesale resurrection of doctrinal formalism of a Langdellian kind.62 If 
we are summoning up the idea of a distinctly legal epistemology or a 
distinctively legal mode of analysis and if we are imagining judges taking 
lessons in it from one another across jurisdictional lines, we must show 
that this episteme is not simply a word game or an unreal “heaven of 
concepts,”63 that we are not just teaching one another new ways of 
“trapezing around in [abstract] cycles and epicycles” without coming 
down to earth on any meaningful grounding.64 
I actually do think there is substance—quite important substance—
in what I am calling the lawyerly approach, in this way of analyzing and 
unpacking issues that lawyers learn and that they can recognize in one 
another and help one another with, even when they come from different 
countries. What I have called legal epistemology involves analysis and 
abstraction, but it is not analysis undertaken for its own sake or 
abstraction just because we are comfortable with high-flown words. The 
abstract analysis, the unpacking or disentangling of complex problems, 
and then their reconstitution into an orderly series of clear questions—all 
of this has a point. It helps us pursue concerns about consistency and 
fairness, so that we abstract away from superficial characteristics and 
deal with deeper and less obvious similarities or differences between one 
case and another. We do this because we think issues of fairness are 
important even when they are not obvious, and when there are multiple 
issues of fairness it is important that they be dealt with in a systematic 
way. A passage that Justice Ginsburg cites from Patricia Wald is 
important here. Judge Wald suggested that reference to “decisions 
rendered abroad” may provide us with indications of “common 
denominators of basic fairness governing relationships between the 
governors and the governed.”65 
In other words, the lawyer’s method of analysis and abstraction is 
important from the point of view of justice. When we take a messy and 
complex situation and try to unravel the separate lines of principle that 
are involved, we are pulling threads and following leads that involve the 
clear identification of the reasons law associates with justice. Clear 
analysis and explicit identification of issues is a way of being scrupulous 
 
 62. For helpful characterizations of the formalism of the late nineteenth century Harvard law 
professor Christopher Columbus Langdell—from which I am trying to distance myself here—see 
Thomas C. Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U. Pitt. L. Rev 1 (1983); see also Richard H. Pildes, Forms 
of Formalism, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 607 (1999). For a modern version of that sort of formalism, see 
Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 Yale L.J. 949 (1988). 
 63. Cf. H.L.A. Hart, Jhering’s Heaven of Concepts and Modern Analytical Jurisprudence, in 
H.L.A. Hart, Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy 265 (1983). 
 64. Cf. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 Colum. L. Rev. 
809, 814 (1935). 
 65. Ginsburg, supra note 3, at 354 (quoting Patricia M. Wald, The Use of International Law in the 
American Adjudicative Process, 27 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 431, 439 (2004)). 
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in our attention to the reasons that law associates with the just rather 
than unjust disposition of cases like the one we are considering. I don’t 
mean that the law that gives us these categories is always just. But it 
presents itself as aiming at justice, and it presents the methodology it 
commands as a way of being maximally responsive in a systematic way to 
the considerations it defines as key to the justice of the matter.66 
The two points connect up with one another. When we say that it is 
important to treat like cases alike, we mean by “like” the similarities that 
seem important or that have seemed important to the law in the past in 
regard to the just disposition of cases like this. And so our alertness to 
relevant similarities and differences is governed by principles of justice 
and focused on what real individuals might have at stake in the issue, 
which justice requires us to take into account. It is not consistency for its 
own sake that we are looking for, for example the consistency that might 
require us to dispose of the one abandoned house on the same basis that 
we disposed of another. We want to be consistent because we are dealing 
with people. We want cases disposed of consistently because we want to 
be fair to the individual persons involved; it is their stakes in the matter 
that command our attention, and it is the issues of justice entangled in 
their legal positions that our analytic lawyering is trying to unravel. 
VI. 
What I have just said is important also for understanding foreign 
courts’ use of U.S. constitutional law. In a variety of areas, American law 
has distinguished itself by developing orderly and fair pathways of 
analysis through difficult and serious issues of legal doctrine. I mentioned 
already the use made of U.S. First Amendment analysis by a New 
Zealand court in the case of Hopkinson.67 It may be helpful to provide 
another example—this one from South Africa. 
When Nelson Mandela became President in 1994, one of the first 
things he did was issue an order for pardon or amnesty freeing all 
mothers in prison with minor children under the age of twelve years.68 
 
 66. See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 157–66 (1994). 
 67. See supra text accompanying notes 5–11. 
 68. The order stated: 
In terms of section 82(1)(k) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993 . . . I 
hereby grant special remission of the remainder of their sentences to . . . all mothers in 
prison on 10 May 1994, with minor children under the age of twelve (12) years . . . . 
Provided that no special remission of sentence will be granted for any of the following 
offences or any attempt, soliciting or conspiracy to commit such an offence: murder; 
culpable homicide; robbery with aggravating circumstances; assault with intent to do 
grievous bodily harm; child abuse; rape; any other crimes of a sexual nature; and trading in 
or cultivating dependence producing substances. 
Presidential Act 17 (1994), cited in President of the Republic of South Africa v. Hugo 1997 (6) BCLR 
708 (CC) ¶ 2 n.3. 
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John Hugo, being a man, was not eligible for the amnesty, although he 
met its other conditions: He was serving a fifteen year sentence and he 
had an eleven-year-old son whose mother had died.69 So Hugo sued, 
complaining that the President’s action violated the constitutional 
prohibition on discrimination, disqualifying him from amnesty, as it did, 
on the ground of sex or gender.70 
The South African Constitutional Court had to decide (1) whether 
this action of the President’s was judicially reviewable, (2) whether it 
constituted discrimination against Mr. Hugo, and (3) if it did, whether 
there might be extenuating circumstances that would allow the 
President’s order to stand.71 The case posed an intriguing tangle of issues. 
Is something akin to a presidential pardon reviewable for failing to 
conform to some general standard like nondiscrimination? Can an act of 
mercy be discriminatory, or unfairly discriminatory, if the applicant has 
no right to it, and if—as is clear in a country where male prisoners 
outnumber female prisoners by fifty to one—an insistence that men and 
women be treated equally in this regard might well lead to no amnesty at 
all? Given that women usually occupy a subordinate role in South 
African families, and given that they almost always have primary 
responsibility for the upbringing of children, can it really be said that a 
man is discriminated against by a measure seeking to benefit women 
prisoners in a specifically family context?72 If the President’s order is an 
infringement of the right to nondiscrimination, is it a justifiable 
infringement in terms of the provision that, in the South African 
Constitution (as in the bills of rights of many countries the world over), 
permits rights to be limited by laws of general application, provided such 
limitation is reasonable and justifiable in a free and democratic society?73 
Can an act of amnesty be regarded as a law of general application, and so 
on? 
One of the striking things about the list of issues I have mentioned is 
that on every one of them, Richard Goldstone, who wrote for the 
Constitutional Court, and his fellow judges (some concurring in his 
decision and some dissenting) referred in detail to the law of other 
jurisdictions. They refer to American, German, Irish, Israeli, English, 
and other Commonwealth case law on the judicial reviewability of 
prerogative actions and the power to pardon, charting a sea change in 
 
 69. See Hugo 1997 (6) BCLR ¶ 1. 
 70. Id. ¶ 3. 
 71. Id. ¶¶ 4–5, 9.  
 72. Id. ¶¶ 37–38. 
 73. “The rights entrenched in this Chapter may be limited by law of general application, provided 
that such limitation—(a) shall be permissible only to the extent that it is—(i) reasonable; and (ii) 
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality.” S. Afr. (Interim) 
Const., 1993, § 33(1). This provision of the Interim Constitution of 1993, which was in force at the 
time, is now replaced by Article 36 (1) of the 1996 final version of the Constitution. 
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constitutionalism around the world that has brought executive 
prerogative powers under the supervision of the rule of law.74 There is 
extensive discussion of the American position on the presidential power 
to pardon, including controversies among American judges about the 
analogies and differences between the presidency and the position of the 
English monarch so far as prerogative power is concerned.75 The judges 
refer to Canadian authority on the meaning of discrimination and its 
relation to the value of human dignity, particularly the dignity of 
groups.76 And several of the judges who considered the application of the 
reasonable limitation clause cited Canadian cases as authority for the 
proposition that, despite appearances, the presidential order could be 
regarded as a law of general application.77 Reading all of the opinions, 
one gets a sense of the judges using foreign law to get their bearings 
among a tangle of issues—exploring the options and following pathways 
pioneered by other courts—to consider various possible models of 
analysis. 
For what it is worth, the outcome was that the court declined to 
overturn the President’s decree.78 The majority (seven judges) reasoned 
that although the measure formally discriminated against Mr. Hugo it did 
not do so unfairly; the presumption of unfairness was rebutted by the fact 
that men did not suffer by the President’s action the loss of any right or 
legal advantage to which they otherwise would have been entitled.79 The 
court said, “The Presidential Act may have denied them an opportunity 
it afforded women, but it cannot be said that it fundamentally impaired 
their rights of dignity or sense of equal worth.”80 Three judges thought 
the decree did constitute unfair discrimination, but one of them argued 
that, as a general measure, it was nevertheless reasonable and justifiable 
in an open and democratic society.81 So in the end there were only two 
dissenters from the outcome. 
The fact that the South African Constitutional Court devoted so 
much attention to foreign law should come as no surprise to anyone 
familiar with its jurisprudence and its constitutional position. Section 35 
of the Interim Constitution, under which Hugo was decided, lays out that 
“[i]n interpreting the provisions of this Chapter [Fundamental Rights] a 
court of law shall . . . . where applicable, have regard to public 
international law applicable to the protection of the rights entrenched in 
 
 74. See, e.g., Hugo 1997 (6) BCLR ¶¶ 18–27. 
 75. Id. ¶ 24. 
 76. Id. ¶ 41. 
 77. Id. ¶¶ 100–01. 
 78. Id. ¶¶ 50–53 
 79. Id. ¶ 47. 
 80. Id.  
 81. See id. ¶ 89. 
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this Chapter, and may have regard to comparable foreign case law.”82 
That stipulation is continued, too, in the present Constitution in 
Article 39.83 One might say that this puts South Africa in a wholly 
different position from that of the U.S. Supreme Court: They are 
explicitly permitted to cite foreign law, whereas there is no such explicit 
permission in the U.S. Constitution, and if some Congressmen had their 
way, there would be an explicit prohibition. Still, it is worth asking what 
reasons underlie this permission in the South African Constitution and 
whether those reasons have any application in countries like the United 
States that do not have such an explicit permission. 
VII. 
Let me take all of this one step further with an analogy. I have long 
been intrigued by what one might call “the cosmopolitanism of 
scientists”—the way scientists talk about what we know or what we think 
we have established, where the “we” doesn’t mean just the scientist 
concerned and friends and colleagues in his laboratory, but the whole 
community of scientists, the world over, understood collectively.84 We 
think the Big Bang happened some ten or twenty billion years ago, but 
there are one or two inconsistencies in the theory and some 
observational anomalies that we have not figured out. We have a pretty 
good account of what causes AIDS and how to mitigate its progress, but 
we do not have anything yet in the way of a vaccine. The term “we” 
always refers to the consensus of the community of scientists in the 
world—scientists who read the same literature, who are aware of one 
another’s findings, who check and recheck one another’s results, and who 
grapple with research problems in roughly the same terms. It is a 
wonderful notion, not least because it involves a cosmopolitan concept of 
community, a civilization-wide connection among humans working 
together.85 
It is not just a matter of a common method. The “we”-locutions that 
I mention are often used to convey a sense of current scientific consensus 
on various issues. They purport to represent the current state of scientific 
knowledge shared and accredited by laboratories and authorities around 
the world. So there is the community of scientists and there is their 
consensus for the time being on which theories are valid, which 
 
 82. S. Afr. (Interim) Const., 1993 § 35(1). 
 83. S. Afr. Const., 1996 § 39(1) (“When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or 
forum . . . must consider international law; and . . . may consider foreign law.”). 
 84. Cf. Jeremy Waldron, Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative, 25 U. Mich. J.L. 
Reform 751, 778 (1992). 
 85. See, e.g., Robert Gascoigne, The Historical Demography of the Scientific Community, 1450–
1900, 22 Soc. Stud. Sci. 545 (1992); see also Struan Jacobs, Scientific Community: Formulations and 
Critique of a Sociological Motif, 38 Brit. J. Soc. 266 (1987). 
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explanations are adequate, which empirical results are reliable, which 
theoretical constructs are useful, and what the current state of play is. No 
doubt the consensus is loose—certainly it is continually evolving—but 
every scientist the world over thinks in terms of this consensus (and the 
community that sustains it) and treats it, if not as the last word on the 
issues it addresses, certainly as the prescriptive starting point. An existing 
scientific consensus does not claim either unanimity among scientists or 
infallibility. Nevertheless, it stands as a repository of enormous value to 
individual researchers as they go about their work, and it is unthinkable 
that any of them would try to proceed without drawing on that repository 
to supplement their own individual research and to provide a basis for its 
critique and evaluation. “Where the global community reaches a 
relatively strong consensus on a particular question, that consensus [has] 
a strong claim to respect as a[n] . . . agreed disciplinary benchmark that 
deserves adherence unless a participant in the community can persuade 
others that the particular starting point is flawed or inapplicable.”86 No 
one in the modern world would take seriously a novel claim about 
energy, gravity, or galaxies that did not refer to the work of the scientific 
community at large. If one wants to challenge the existing consensus as a 
scientist, one necessarily works out from the inside of it, at every stage 
submitting one’s results and the inferences drawn from them to be 
checked and evaluated by one’s peers. 
There is a useful and illuminating analogy between the role played 
by consensus and community in science and the role played by consensus 
and global legal community in law.87 Scientific consensus is available as a 
resource and as a prescriptive starting point for individual scientific 
endeavor. And similarly, modes of legal analysis are available to 
lawmakers and judges in each individual country as derived from a global 
heritage of legal insight, reminding them, in Justice Ginsburg’s words, 
that there is a “store of knowledge relevant to the solution of trying 
questions,”88 that their particular problem has been confronted before, 
and that they, like scientists, should try to think it through in the 
company of those who have already had to grapple with it. The analogy 
is no doubt imperfect—like all analogies, it is not supposed to convey an 
impression of equivalence—and I will address some objections to it 
below. 
First, let me elaborate its implications for the use of foreign law. My 
analogy is between scientific and legal analysis and the role played by 
global consensus in each. But consider for a moment a more direct—less 
 
 86. Rosalind Dixon, A Democratic Theory of Constitutional Comparison, 56 Am. J. Comp. L. 947, 
957 (2008). 
 87. This was one of the main themes in Waldron, supra note 21, at 132, 138, 143. 
 88. Ginsburg, supra note 2, at 190. 
Waldron_63-HLJ-1243 (Do Not Delete) 6/24/2012 8:29 PM 
June 2012] GINSBURG AND THE USE OF FOREIGN LAW 1261 
analogical—relation between policymaking and the global scientific 
consensus. 
Consider how we might expect our public health authorities to deal 
with a new disease or epidemic appearing within our borders, which we 
had never confronted before but which had afflicted other countries. It 
would be ridiculous to say that because this problem had arisen in the 
United States, we should look only to American science to solve it, as if 
to say, “We must never forget that this is an American epidemic we are 
fighting.” On the contrary, we would want to look abroad to see what 
scientific conclusions and strategies had emerged, what had been tested, 
and what possible solutions had been validated in the public health 
practices of other countries (and in their relations with one another). Of 
course, the choice of any strategy or proposed solution would be in the 
end a matter for us. Our scientists would have to take responsibility for 
their recommendations and our policymakers for their decisions. But it 
would be culpable folly for either group to turn their back on other 
countries’ experience and accumulated expertise. 
Even if they were convinced that American conditions were 
different, with the disease mutating and responding differently to our 
particular environment, still they would want to ensure that they 
responded rationally to those differences, identifying conditions that 
called for an approach unlike those tried in other countries and having 
some detailed sense of how to measure and respond proportionately to 
the differentiating factors. So even there, we would want to pay attention 
to the world’s experience with such differences as the disease had faced 
beyond our shores, in order to ensure that we were taking a rational 
approach to the differences it exhibited among us. 
That is a matter of policy, but it also helps us think through this 
business of legal analysis. Justice Ginsburg mentioned the new problems 
posed in the war against terrorism.89 But the point applies to legal 
problems generally. When we face a novel legal question in the United 
States—say a question about the possible implementation of a regime 
permitting euthanasia—we need to consider the experience that other 
legal systems have had with this problem. Most countries that consider 
anything like legalized euthanasia want to maintain a prohibition on 
certain forms of encouraging and assisting suicide, and they want to 
hedge their assisted suicide regime against abuses and forms of coercive 
pressure that might be put upon ailing individuals. They want to do all 
that, but they do not want unduly to encumber end-of-life decisions by 
individuals who otherwise face the prolonged process of dying in 
circumstances of pain and degradation, and they want do to all of this in 
a way that accords the greatest respect to individual autonomy and 
 
 89. Ginsburg, supra note 33, at 1041. 
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dignity (mindful of the fact that each of those values points in several 
different directions in this problem). The countries of the world are at 
different stages in working thorough this tangle of issues.90 Some of the 
knowledge about how to think all of this through that is available in the 
world is available primarily in the experience of one or two particular 
countries; that is why Chief Justice Rehnquist drew extensively on the 
experience of the Netherlands in his opinion in Washington v. 
Glucksberg.91 Other broad conclusions have emerged or are emerging as 
a matter of consensus among those that have experimented with various 
permissive regimes: Certain forms of regulation have been found to 
work, while others have proved less reliable, so far as protecting 
vulnerable individuals is concerned.92 It makes no sense to try to work 
through the legal dimensions of this problem in ignorance of both the 
individual and accumulated experience of other countries. And I mean 
not just experience about what works and what does not, but experience 
with the legal analysis of this problem: looking to forms of analysis that 
others have pioneered that open the prospect of our being able to 
identify and attend methodically to the issues and values that matter in 
this tangle. That is the prospect that consensus and juridical community 
hold out in the world, and we would be fools not to avail ourselves of it. 
Of course, conditions may be different here. Maybe wealth-
maximizing Americans are more likely to pressure their elderly relatives 
to die. Still, the world has experience of responding to different 
conditions, and we would do well to avail ourselves of that experience to 
ensure that we are not responding arbitrarily or irrationally to local 
peculiarities. It is true, too, that any legal analysis we undertake must in 
the first instance respect the constitutional dimensions of these problems. 
The federal structure of the United States is a prime example: Is this to 
be decided at a federal level or left up to the states? But even on that 
point, it is possible that there is something to be learned from other 
countries about how to analyze the bearing of federal structure on a 
problem such as this—just as we think there is something we can teach 
the world from our experience of addressing the federal dimension of the 
abortion issue. And, fortunately, our Constitution is sufficiently 
capacious in the values it invokes, and in that respect sufficiently like 
other bills and charters of rights, so that even while we work within its 
provisions, we still find ourselves having to grapple with the same tangle 
 
 90. Raphael Cohen-Almagor, Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide in the Democratic 
World: A Legal Overview, 16 N.Y. Int’l L. Rev. 1 (2003). 
 91. 521 U.S. 702, 730, 732, 734–35 (1997). 
 92. See, e.g., André Janssen, The New Regulation of Voluntary Euthanasia and Medically Assisted 
Suicide in the Netherlands, 16 Int’l J.L. Pol’y & Fam. 260 (2002). 
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of autonomy-related, dignity-related, and protective issues that other 
countries have to grapple with. 
So there is the analogy. A scientist does not think of pursuing 
research on gravity, energy, or galaxies without reference to the existing 
work of the scientific community. She relies on and begins from the 
scientific consensus of established and verified results. And the same is 
true for law. We do not try to solve these problems as though the world 
had never grappled with them before. We pay attention to what other 
jurists have done with the issue we face. We treat it as a problem to be 
solved by paying attention to the established deliverances of legal 
science—the experience, which many legal systems share, of grappling 
with, untangling, analyzing, and resolving rival rights and claims, 
principles and values that come together in issues of this kind. The idea 
of this common body of legal knowledge treats the problems that arise in 
our courts as though they were questions for legal science. It does not 
simply look to “foreign moods, fads, or fashions.”93 It relies instead on 
the idea that solutions to certain kinds of problems in the law might be 
established in the way that scientific theories are established. They are 
not established as infallible, they change over the years, and there are 
always outliers who refuse to accept them—some cranky, and some 
whose reluctance leads eventually to progress. But to ignore foreign 
solutions, or to refrain from attending to them because they are foreign, 
betokens not just an objectionable parochialism, but an obtuseness as to 
the nature of the problems we face. 
I do not claim an equivalence between law and science;94 my analogy 
is oriented specifically to the role that global community and consensus 
play in each of two otherwise quite different enterprises. For of course 
there are very considerable differences between the scientific epistemology 
and the epistemology of law. The point is that in each case, in science and 
also in law, there is a shared methodology underwritten by some sort of 
global community. It is community on that scale that enables scientists 
from one country to talk to one another, to share a sense of common 
enterprise, and to recognize and assist one another with their common 
methodology. And I believe it is something analogous that enables 
lawyers, jurists, and judges from one country to share a sense of common 
enterprise with lawyers, jurists, and judges from another country. 
Nor am I advocating a consensus theory of truth for either law or 
science. The scientific community’s consensus for the time being is 
always understood to be fallible, and it is judged in the last analysis by 
 
 93. Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 990 n.* (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari) 
(“[T]his Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence should not impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions 
on Americans.”). 
 94. Cf. Roger P. Alford, Free Speech and the Case for Constitutional Exceptionalism, 106 Mich. L. 
Rev. 1071, 1085 (2008). 
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criteria of external truth. (Some philosophical skeptics may quibble with 
that, but my position is not built on that sort of skepticism.) And it is 
precisely because they are trying to describe and explain a theory- and 
mind-independent world that the whole business of checking and 
rechecking and endeavoring to duplicate one another’s experimental 
results is so important. Engagement with community and attention to 
consensus are like mandatory heuristics relative to the pursuit of truth. In 
science they are not the point of the exercise, but they are indispensable 
to it. The consensus and community that I have in mind, then, comprise 
not just an accumulation of authorities but a dense network of checking 
and rechecking results, experimental duplication, credentialing, mutual 
elaboration, and building on one another’s work. Neither of these 
communities offers any guarantees so far as the overall aim of the 
enterprise is concerned: truth in the case of science, justice or right in the 
case of law. A consensus in either field can be wrong. Still, in neither 
field is there a sensible alternative to paying attention to the established 
body of findings to which others have contributed over the years. 
James Allan has argued that my analogy with science “suggests that 
the legal consensus of [foreign] judges somehow sits atop a body of mind-
independent . . . truths, as it does in the scientific realm.”95 And that, he 
thinks, makes no sense at all. Judges are not trying to access mind-
independent truth in their deliberations in the way that scientists are, and 
even if they were, there is no mind-independent truth, corresponding to 
their assertions about justice or right, for them to access.96 On that basis 
Allan thinks my analogy is entirely inappropriate. 
But one does not have to be a believer in the philosophy of 
objective right answers in law to accept the analogy I am offering. 
Whether one is a philosophical objectivist or not, one likely will proceed 
in argument and analysis as though it mattered to deal competently and 
in an orderly and consistent fashion with issues of rightness and justice. 
That is why the observation that Justice Ginsburg quoted from Patricia 
Wald is so important. We care about the fairness and consistency of our 
decisionmaking and because of that, we have reason to look to what 
Judge Wald called “common denominators of basic fairness governing 
relationships between the governors and the governed” in the analyses 
that we deploy.97 And when we consider that we are not the first to care 
 
 95. James Allan, Jeremy Waldron and the Philosopher’s Stone, 45 San Diego L. Rev. 133, 141 
(2008). 
 96. Id. at 146 (“Waldron’s attempt to harness for the realm of law the same sense of solid, 
objective, timeless knowledge that exists . . . in the realm of the natural sciences is not successful. If 
American judges ought to . . . consider . . . the consensus of opinion of foreign judges, it cannot be 
because that consensus represents what it does in the natural sciences, namely the currently existing 
best understanding by us limited, biological humans of the underlying, mind-independent reality of 
our external causal world.”). 
 97. Patricia M. Wald, The Use of International Law in the American Adjudicative Process, 
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about legal analysis for this reason in a given legal context, we will want 
to look at how other responsible reasoners have worked their way fairly 
and consistently through the issues that we have to address. Maybe 
someone who thinks of law and judicial decisionmaking as just a matter 
of will, a matter of arbitrary fiat, will struggle to see the point of this. But 
anyone who cares about legal reasoning will want to be less abrupt and 
better informed than that. 
Of course we know that people disagree about the first principles of 
justice and rightness and that they may bring different conceptions of 
these values to any particular exercise in legal analysis. In theory, then, a 
conservative judge approaching (say) assisted suicide or the juvenile 
death penalty will approach those problems with different sentiments 
and perhaps with a different sense of what counts as an adequate analysis 
compared with a liberal judge. If the conservative were to engage in an 
inquiry into foreign law he might use the products of his inquiry in a 
different way than would his liberal counterpart. That is not to say that 
the two of them might not both learn something from that inquiry, 
though it may not be the same thing. But it is also perfectly possible that 
they may both benefit in the same way from paying attention to decisions 
elsewhere in the world. For the propositions that they are grappling with 
need not be the ultimate loci of their moral or ideological disagreements. 
Often what legal analysis focuses on is the bearing on a tangled situation 
of intermediate principles that may well be shared by those who disagree 
about ultimate values. They may be shared either because these 
intermediate principles represent a sort of plateau of moral common 
sense, or they may be shared because the two opposed judges are 
required by the law to address a common question—say, about the 
cruelty of a given punishment (even if only one of them thinks in his 
heart that cruelty is a bad thing in a punishment) or about equal 
protection (even if one of them is, at base, not an egalitarian). The two of 
them may still think themselves bound to analyze the bearing of one—or 
several—of these principles on a tangled legal problem, and they may 
both welcome and profit from the assistance that a global consensus 
provides in indicating what counts as a respectable and disciplined way to 
conduct such analysis. 
VIII. 
In this Article, I have taken various observations and insights from 
Justice Ginsburg’s consideration of the practice of citing foreign law, and 
I have tried to elaborate, in my own terms, the points that she has made 
and to explore some of the directions in which she has pointed us. I hope 
I have not been guilty of putting words into her mouth. Most of the 
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comments here are mine, and of course I take responsibility for whatever 
fallacies and exaggerations they may involve. But I offer it to her 
nevertheless in the spirit of the best tribute that can be paid to a thinker 
in jurisprudence (in fact, in any intellectual endeavor). The thing to do is 
not just to echo or repeat another’s views, but to build on them—to pick 
up the ball that has been passed and run with it for a little while. We 
need, as I have said, much more in the way of reflection and theory on 
this matter of the citation and use of foreign law. Justice Ginsburg’s 
observations are a beginning, and this Article is a pursuit of that beginning. 
